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Abstract
Is corporate tax competition a threat to democracy in the EU? The answer depends 
crucially on a positive analysis of the effects of tax competition on national policy au-
tonomy. Most analyses focus on direct effects on corporate tax rates and revenues. We 
contend that this focus is too narrow. It overlooks the fact that corporate tax competi-
tion also has important indirect effects on the progressivity and revenue-raising po-
tential of personal income taxation. We elaborate on these indirect effects theoretically 
and empirically, and explore the implications for the normative debate on the EU’s 
democratic defi cit. Our fi ndings show that European integration can constrain national 
redistribution in a major way: the democratic defi cit is real. Greater political contesta-
tion over the EU’s policy agenda is desirable in order to mitigate this defi cit.
Zusammenfassung
Wie bedrohlich ist der Unternehmenssteuerwettbewerb für die Demokratie in der Eu-
ropäischen Union? Die Antwort hängt in entscheidendem Maße von einer empirischen 
Analyse der Effekte des Steuerwettbewerbs auf die nationale Gesetzgebungsautonomie 
ab. Bisher sind in der vergleichenden Forschung fast nur die direkten Effekte des Steuer-
wettbewerbs auf Unternehmenssteuersätze und -einnahmen analysiert worden. Dieser 
Fokus ist zu eng. So wird systematisch übersehen, dass der Unternehmenssteuerwettbe-
werb auch wichtige indirekte Effekte auf die Progressivität und das Aufkommenspoten-
zial der persönlichen Einkommensteuer hat. Diese indirekten Effekte werden theore-
tisch und empirisch nachgewiesen und ihre Implikationen für die normative Debatte 
über das Demokratiedefi zit der EU erörtert. Die Analyse zeigt, dass die europäische 
Integration die Spielräume für eine eigenständige nationale Umverteilungspolitik er-
heblich beschränkt: Das demokratische Defi zit ist also durchaus real. Eine stärkere Po-
litisierung der europäischen Politikagenda wäre wünschenswert, um dieses Defi zit zu 
mildern.
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1 Tax competition, tax harmonization and democracy
Tax competition features prominently in two closely related debates on European poli-
tics: a policy debate on the desirability and necessity of EU-level involvement in com-
pany taxation,1 and a normative debate on the so-called democratic defi cit. The policy 
debate focuses on the issue of tax harmonization: Should the EU engage in (minimum) 
tax rate harmonization in order to reduce the scope for tax competition among the 
member states, as proposed, for example, by the Ruding Report (1992: 209) or the Ger-
man and French governments in 2004 (Financial Times 2004)? The debate on the EU’s 
democratic defi cit centers on the question of the redistributive consequences of Euro-
pean integration: Are EU policies redistributive, and if so, should there be more political 
contestation about the EU policy agenda (e.g. Follesdal/Hix 2006; Scharpf 2006)?
Both debates are riddled by contradictory evidence on the effects of tax competition. As 
Figure 1 shows, the average statutory company tax rate of the EU-15 countries has fallen 
continuously since the 1980s. This allows proponents of a minimum tax rate policy 
to point at a “mad race” to the bottom in corporate taxation that needs to be stopped 
(Strauss-Kahn 2004: 60). Those concerned about the redistributive consequences of 
European integration can cite the downward trend as evidence of democratic control of 
national tax policy choices being eroded by competitive constraints in the Single Market 
(e.g. Scharpf 2003b). Figure 1 also shows, however, that the general drop in company tax 
rates did not result in a similar drop in company tax revenues. To the contrary, the un-
weighted average of revenues actually increased over the 1990s. This seems to vindicate 
those policy experts, including the European Commissioner for Taxation Lásló Kovács, 
who doubt the need for a minimum tax rate (e.g. Kovács 2004). It also seems to prove 
those authors correct who contend that European integration is either not redistribu-
tive or guarantees centrist policy outcomes (Majone 1998; Moravcsik 2002). 
We contend that both debates suffer from a one-sided conception of the effects of com-
pany tax competition. They proceed from the implicit assumption that the only poten-
tially important effect of tax competition is the direct effect on company tax revenue. By 
contrast, we argue that tax competition also has important indirect effects on personal 
income taxation. The corporate tax not only serves as a revenue-raising instrument in 
its own right but also as a kind of backstop for the personal income tax. In the absence 
of a separate tax for corporations, companies could be used as tax shelters for personal 
income. By helping to prevent this, the corporation tax protects the personal income 
tax base. Tax competition undermines this backstop function of the corporate tax by 
We would like to thank Christian Bellak, Christian Breunig, Fritz W. Scharpf, Peter B. Sørensen, and 
Thomas Rixen for their useful discussions, comments and suggestions. Genschel gratefully acknowl-
edges funding by the German Science Foundation (CRC 597 “Transformations of the State”).
1 The terms “company taxation” and “corporate taxation” are used interchangeably in this paper. 
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pushing corporate tax rates down. Hence tax competition indirectly constrains the rev-
enue-raising potential and/or the progressivity of the personal income tax.2 
In sections 2 and 3, we demonstrate fi rst theoretically and then empirically that com-
pany tax competition has signifi cant indirect effects on personal income taxation. In 
section 4, we discuss the implications for the related debates on the democracy defi cit 
and on company tax harmonization in the EU. We endorse calls for greater political 
contestation about the EU’s policy agenda (Follesdal/Hix 2006). While the processes for 
deciding policy issues cannot become much more politicized and “majoritarian” in the 
near future, the processes for defi ning policy issues can and should be changed in this 
direction. This would still have to lead to proposals that can muster broad support. But 
2 The revenue-raising potential and the progressivity of the personal income tax are closely relat-
ed. If income tax rates are cut across the board, revenues might fall while progressivity remains 
unchanged. Conversely, if income tax rates are only cut at the top of the income distribution, 
revenues might remain more or less unchanged while progressivity is reduced. 
Tax revenue
Tax rate
Figure 1 Average corporate tax rates and revenues of EU-15 countries, 1980−2005
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1980 1985
30
35
40
45
50
1990 1995 2000 2005
6
9
3
0
Average company tax revenue as % of GDP
Sources: Tax rates: various sources, see Ganghof (2006: Appendix); tax revenue: OECD (2004). 
Notes: Unweighted averages. Tax rates are for retained corporate profits and include temporary 
surcharges as well as local business taxes.
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these proposals would differ from the ones pursued in a depoliticized policy debate. We 
illustrate this point by sketching a proposal for tax harmonization that focuses on the 
much neglected backstop function of company taxes. Section 5 summarizes the main 
points. 
2 The indirect effects of company tax competition: Theory
In order to gain theoretical understanding of the indirect effects of company tax com-
petition, we fi rst introduce a somewhat abstract, but crucial, distinction between two 
types of profi ts: normal and above-normal profi ts. Equipped with this distinction, we 
can better understand the nature of company tax competition, the nature of the com-
pany tax’s backstop function and the consequences of tax competition for this backstop 
function. 
From an economic perspective, there are two types of what is usually called “capital 
income”: normal and above-normal. The normal return to capital is the return to de-
ferring consumption, i.e. the (risk-free) return to wealth. For instance, if someone buys 
a machine, she wants this investment to generate at least the return she would have 
received from buying government bonds. This is the normal return. Above-normal re-
turns go beyond this level. They include various things, such as returns to innovation, 
returns to market power or returns to entrepreneurial skill. Bill Gates’ income from 
his share of profi ts from Microsoft consists mostly of above-normal returns (Slemrod/
Bakija 2004: 203–204).
The distinction between normal and above-normal profi ts helps to understand why the 
pressure of tax competition is particularly strong on statutory company tax rates – re-
gardless of the defi nition of the tax base. A low statutory rate not only serves as a highly 
visible signal of a business-friendly general tax climate and a disincentive for cross-
country profi t-shifting, it is also instrumental for attracting foreign direct investment 
(Devereux/Sørensen 2006). Foreign investment is usually premised on the expectation 
of signifi cant above-normal profi ts. Above-normal profi ts, however, tend to imply a 
high exposure to taxation at the full statutory company tax rate. Companies at low lev-
els of profi tability are not very sensitive to the statutory tax rate if generous investment 
tax credits, depreciation schedules or other forms of tax relief are available. By contrast, 
companies at high levels of profi tability are highly sensitive because they have lots of 
profi ts which are taxable at the statutory rate. Hence, to the extent that countries com-
pete for profi table investment, they face strong incentives to cut the statutory corporate 
tax rate – even if this cut is paid for by broadening the corporate tax base (Bond 2002). 
Note that this account of tax competition is fully compatible with “ideational” expla-
nations of income tax reforms (for a detailed discussion, see Ganghof 2006: Ch. 3–4). 
8 MPIfG Discussion Paper 07 / 2
These explanations state that, in the 1970s, policymakers had become increasingly 
dissatisfi ed with taxation systems that intervened in the structure of savings and in-
vestments and thus, in the 1980s, started to move toward more “market-conforming” 
systems by lowering statutory rates and broadening tax bases (Swank 1998; Steinmo 
2003; Stewart/Webb 2006). These explanations are no challenge to the tax competition 
hypothesis because, even if “market conformity” is the goal, there are good reasons to 
maintain relatively high company tax rates on above-normal profi ts. One reason is that, 
in standard public fi nance theory, taxing above-normal profi ts is less harmful for do-
mestic investment incentives than taxing normal profi ts. Shifting the tax burden from 
normal to above-normal profi ts may thus increase tax effi ciency.3 
The second argument for a relatively high tax rate for above-normal corporate profi ts 
draws on the backstop function of the corporate tax mentioned above (Mintz 1995). 
Because company income differs from personal business income in legal form but not 
in material substance, the exemption of company income from taxation would create a 
signifi cant loophole in the tax system. High-income taxpayers could reduce their per-
sonal income tax burden by storing part of this income in a corporation. One purpose 
of the company tax is to plug this loophole. It does so most effectively if the company 
tax rate is equal to the top personal income tax rate (Stotsky 1995: 282; Tanzi/Zee 2000: 
310). For if the company rate is much lower than the top personal rate, an incentive re-
mains for high-income earners to shift income into the corporate sector. Therefore, to 
the extent that a high top personal income tax rate is desired, the company tax rate has 
to be kept high too in order to avoid a large rate gap between both taxes. 
The problem is that a high company tax rate that applies to all company income alike, 
signifi cantly reduces domestic investment incentives. In the absence of tax competition, 
however, this problem could be dealt with by aligning only the company tax rate on 
above-normal profi ts with the (high) top personal tax rate. By contrast, the tax rate on 
normal profi ts could be set at a much lower level. This tax rate could even be zero, which 
would turn the income tax into what economists call a “direct consumption tax.” For, in 
this case, the income tax base would consist mainly of above-normal profi ts and wages, 
and, thus, be essentially identical to that of a European-style value added tax.  
Hence by maintaining a relatively high tax rate on above-normal company profi ts, gov-
ernments can potentially achieve a rather effi cient form of company taxation and back 
up a high progressive personal income tax. They can set the tax rate on above-normal 
profi ts with one eye on their preferred level of the top personal income tax rate, while 
setting the tax rate on normal profi ts with the other eye on domestic investment in-
centives. Italy’s “dual income tax” (1998–2004) approximated to such a system along 
crucial dimensions (Bordignon/Giannini/Panteghini 2001): fi rms’ normal return on 
3 Of course, there is signifi cant disagreement about the relative effi ciency of different tax struc-
tures. For a discussion of different dimensions and notions of tax effi ciency, see Ganghof 
(2006). 
Ganghof, Genschel: Taxation and Democracy in the EU 9
(new) equity was taxed at a rate of 19 percent, whereas above-normal returns were ei-
ther subjected to the corporate tax rate of 37 percent or, in the case of unincorporated 
businesses, to the top personal tax rate of 46 percent. In the absence of corporate tax 
competition, this type of dual income tax would have been attractive for many national 
governments trying to implement a progressive but nevertheless market-conforming 
income tax (Ganghof 2006).
Given tax competition on statutory corporate tax rates, however, a high corporate tax 
rate is a competitive disadvantage – even if this rate only applies to above-normal prof-
its. Company tax rates have to fall so that the attractiveness of the Italian-style dual 
income tax is undermined. In fact, this system has been abolished in Italy rather than 
being copied by other countries.
The conclusion is that, by pushing down company tax rates, tax competition reduces 
the ability of governments to design corporate taxes that are effi cient and provide an 
effective backstop for personal income taxation. Effi ciency is more diffi cult to achieve 
because lower corporate tax rates mean that corporate tax bases have to be broadened 
in order to defend revenue. Broader bases, in turn, reduce the scope for exempting nor-
mal profi ts from (full) taxation. The backstop function is undermined because lower 
corporate tax rates imply that governments have either to accept a widening tax rate 
gap between corporate and (high) top personal income tax rates, and hence wasteful 
arbitrage between the personal and the corporate sector (tax rate gap effect), or to lower 
top personal rates in step with the corporate rates (pull down effect). Both effects impair 
the progressivity and revenue-raising potential of the personal income tax. 
One complication should be noted at this point. Even in the face of tax competition, 
national policymakers do not have to abandon the idea of taxing above-normal profi ts 
higher than normal profi ts. Rather, they can shift the taxation of above-normal prof-
its from the level of the corporation to the level of the shareholder. The idea, in other 
words, is to tax above-normal profi ts in the form of dividends and realized capital gains. 
Indeed, there has been a trend within the EU of shifting the tax burden away from the 
level of the corporation and onto the level of the shareholder. What is more, Norway (as 
a non-EU country) has recently introduced a type of dual income tax that systematically 
distinguishes between normal and above-normal profi ts: most normal capital income is 
taxed at a uniform tax rate of 28 percent, labor income is taxed at progressive rates of up 
to 43.5 percent (61.1 percent if social security contributions are included), and above-
normal profi ts are taxed at the shareholder level at 48 percent (Sørensen 2005a). 
This new Norwegian system can partly be understood as a pragmatic adaptation of 
the Italian-style dual income tax to the reality of tax competition. However, the taxa-
tion of above-normal profi ts at the level of shareholders tends to be administratively 
much more complex and costly than at the level of the corporation (Sørensen 2005b). 
Therefore, the Norwegian system does not solve the problem outlined above: competi-
tive pressure to reduce tax rates on retained company profi ts tends to undermine the 
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backstop function of company taxation and thus increases the costs of progressive in-
come taxation. Hence continuous cuts in company tax rates will sooner or later lead to 
reduced income tax progressivity or revenues – or both. 
3 The indirect effects of company tax competition: Evidence
In this section we present qualitative and quantitative evidence supporting our theo-
retical argument. We start by showing that the comparative patterns of company tax 
rate cuts are well explained by tax competition. We then move on to empirically explore 
two effects of corporate tax cuts. We show that lower corporate tax rates are associated 
with higher tax rate gaps between corporate and personal taxation (tax rate gap effect) 
and that they tend to pull down personal income tax rates (pull-down effect), everything 
else being equal. 
Evidence for tax competition: Company tax rates and country size
There is some econometric evidence that tax competition has been a contributory fac-
tor in falling corporate tax rates (e.g. Swank/Steinmo 2002). Instead of surveying the 
relevant literature (for a recent review, see Devereux/Sørensen 2006: 17–20), we focus 
on a simple indicator to demonstrate that competitive incentives signifi cantly affect tax 
rate choice: country size. The rationale for this indicator is provided by the theoretical 
standard model of tax competition (see e.g. Baldwin/Krugman 2002; Rixen 2006). One 
prominent result of this model is that small countries have more to gain from tax cuts 
because their domestic tax base is small compared to that of the rest of the world (e.g. 
Kanbur/Keen 1993). The chances are, therefore, that the revenue loss from the rate cut 
– i.e. revenue forfeited from the domestic base – will be more than compensated for by 
the revenue gain from the infl ow of foreign tax base. As a consequence, small states have 
lower tax rates in equilibrium. 
It follows that we should not necessarily expect absolute convergence of tax rates, i.e. 
a shrinking tax rate distribution as measured by the coeffi cient of variation. Rather, 
theory leads us to expect conditional convergence as measured by the correlation coef-
fi cient between corporate tax rates and country size (Ganghof 2006: 140).
The evidence is in line with this expectation. Table 1 compares company tax rates in 
1980 and 2006. It shows that the drastic fall in the average tax rate shown in Figure 1 was 
not accompanied by absolute convergence. The coeffi cient of variation for the EU-15 
countries was even slightly higher in 2006 than in 1980. However, as Figure 2 demon-
strates, conditional convergence increased strongly. While the correlation between com-
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pany tax rate and country size was essentially zero in the early 1980s, it increased almost 
continuously after 1986. In 2005 the correlation coeffi cient (Pearson’s r) was .55 – and 
as high as .76 if the special case of Luxembourg is excluded (about which, see below).4 
This strong pattern of conditional convergence clearly corroborates the tax-competi-
tion explanation of company tax cuts.
Figure 3 shows that Eastern enlargement has not substantially changed the empirical 
picture. The correlation between country size and tax rates also holds for the EU-25.5 
But there are outliers. Poland, for example, is large in size but has a fairly low tax rate. 
Luxembourg and Malta, in contrast, are small but have relatively high tax rates. One 
reason is that both countries relied heavily on preferential tax regimes in the past – a 
4 Due to missing population data for 2006, the time series of correlation coeffi cients ends in 
2005. 
5 Note that the correlation between country size and company tax rates also shows up in much 
larger samples and is robust to the inclusion of economic control variables such as total tax 
levels, GDP per capita or capital controls (Ganghof 2005).
Table 1 Company and personal income tax rates in the EU
Country 1980 2006
EU-15 Company Top Personal Rate Gap Company Top Personal Rate gap
Austria 61 62  1 25 50 25
Belgium 48 72  24 34 54  20
Denmark 40 67  27 28 62  34
Finland 59 67  8 26 51  25
France 50 60  10 33 56  23
Germany 62 56  –6 38 44  6
Greece 43 60  17 29 40  11
Ireland 45 60  15 13 42  29
Italy 36 76  40 37 43  6
Luxembourg 47 58  11 30 39  9
Netherlands 48 72  24 30 52  22
Portugal  55* 80  25 28 42  14
Spain 33 66  33 35 45  10
Sweden 60 87  27 28 57  29
UK 52 60  8 30 40  10
NMS-10
Cyprus n.a. n.a. n.a.  10  30  20
Czech Republic n.a. n.a. n.a.  24  32  8
Estonia n.a. n.a. n.a.  0  23  23
Hungary n.a. n.a. n.a.  22  40  18
Latvia n.a. n.a. n.a.  15  25  10
Lithuania n.a. n.a. n.a.  19  27  8
Malta n.a. n.a. n.a.  35  35  0
Poland n.a. n.a. n.a.  19  40  21
Slovenia n.a. n.a. n.a.  25  50  25
Slovak Republic n.a. n.a. n.a.  19  19  0
EU-15 average 49 67 18  30  48  18
EU-15 CV 0.18 0.13 0.68  0.2  0.15  0.49
EU-25 average n.a. n.a. n.a.  25  42  16
EU-25 CV n.a. n.a. n.a.  0.35  0.26  0.57
Notes: Rounded to the nearest percentage point.
n.a. = not available; * = data for 1982; CV = Coeffi cient of Variation.
Sources: See Ganghof (2006: Appendix).
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competitive strategy that has recently come under serious attack from the EU’s code of 
conduct in business taxation and the Commission’s competition policy (Genschel 2002: 
220–231). Another reason is precisely the backstop function of the company tax. Prefer-
ential regimes have made it easier for both countries to keep general corporate tax rates 
up in order to maintain small tax rate gaps and thus reduce domestic economic distor-
tions (Table 1). In Malta, the tax rate gap is actually zero, and shareholders receive a full 
tax credit for taxes already paid at the level of the corporation (full imputation system). 
This system, fi rst introduced in Germany in 1977, was once seen as the most advanced 
option for market-conforming company taxation at the domestic level (Ganghof 2006). 
Given tax competition, however, such a system is virtually impossible to maintain in 
high-tax countries. Malta, being a relatively low-tax country relying on preferential re-
gimes, has greater degrees of freedom. As preferential regimes are increasingly phased 
out, however, the competitive disadvantages of a relatively high general corporate tax 
rate will increase, while the costs of maintaining domestic market conformity will rise 
(European Commission 2006).
Figure 2 Correlation between company tax rates and country size, 1980−2005
EU-15
Correlation coefficient (Pearson's r)
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
–.4
–.2
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
Sources: Tax rates: various sources, see Ganghof (2006: Appendix); population: World Bank (2003). 
Notes: Country size = In(population). Missing population data for recent years is replaced by the values 
for the latest available year.
Year
EU-15 excluding Luxembourg
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Tax competition and the tax rate gap effect 
As Table 1 shows, the tax rate gaps between company and personal taxation have not 
been reduced. One prominent interpretation of these gaps is that “EU member states 
do not seem to prefer a tight link between corporate and personal tax rates” (Sørensen 
2004: 106). The problem with this preference explanation is that it is in many ways 
observationally equivalent to the explanation that member states do have a clear prefer-
ence for a tight link between corporate and personal tax rates but are heavily constrained 
in acting upon this preference. In this section we argue that this tax-competition expla-
nation is superior.
First, the preference for a small tax rate gap follows logically from two generally accept-
ed premises discussed above: that policymakers have sought to make tax policy more 
neutral or market-conforming since the 1980s and that a small tax rate gap is conducive 
to this goal.
Figure 3 Company tax rates and country sizes of EU member states, 2005
Corporate tax rate in %
13 14 15 16 17 18
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Population (natural logarithm)
EU-25
EU-25 excluding Malta and Luxembourg
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France
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Portugal
Lithuania
Ireland
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Slovak Republic Poland
Austria
Luxembourg
Malta
Cyprus
Estonia
Hungary
Sources: Tax rates: various sources, see Ganghof (2006: Appendix); tax revenue: OECD (2004); popula-
tion: World Bank (2003)
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Second, Ganghof (2006: Ch. 1) uses time series data for a sample of 21 OECD countries 
to show that the average tax rate gap was indeed almost cut in half, from around 20 to 
around 10 percentage points, between 1975 and 1989. After 1989, however, when com-
pany tax competition had become more acute, the average tax rate gap widened again, 
to more than 15 percent in 2004, with corporate tax rates being cut more heavily than 
top personal rates.
Third, detailed investigation of the timing of tax rate changes in particular countries 
provide further support for the tax-competition explanation of tax rate gaps. For ex-
ample, in 1977 Germany deliberately introduced a zero tax rate gap but was forced to 
gradually widen it after the early 1990s. Similarly, the goal of aligning the company tax 
rate with the top rate on personal capital income was an important goal of Danish tax 
policy in the mid 1980s. For this reason, Denmark increased the company tax rate from 
40 to 50 percent in 1986. Once the full force of competitive pressures became obvious, 
however, Denmark was forced to cut its company tax rate. By 2005, the company tax 
rate had dropped to 28 percent, creating a gap between marginal tax rates on corporate 
and personal capital income of more than 30 percentage points. Similar stories can be 
told about other member states (see Ganghof 2006). 
Finally, we perform a simple regression of tax rate gaps, i.e. the difference between top 
personal income tax rate and company tax rate in EU member states. 6 The most impor-
tant prediction following from the preference explanation would seem to be that cor-
porate tax rates are unrelated to tax rate gaps (Sørensen 2004: 106): countries with low 
company tax rates are as likely to choose a large (or small) tax rate gap as countries with 
high company tax rates. In contrast, the tax-competition explanation predicts that low 
company tax rates are systematically associated with high tax rate gaps: the more coun-
tries are constrained by tax competition, the more diffi cult it becomes to maintain a 
small gap. To compare these two hypotheses, we have to control for other variables that 
potentially infl uence the setting of top personal income tax rates. To keep the model 
simple, we focus on two variables. The fi rst is the total tax level as a percentage of GDP. 
As Ganghof (2006) shows, total tax burdens are positively related to labor tax burdens, 
and high labor tax burdens tend to translate into high top personal income tax rates. 
The second variable is country wealth, i.e. GDP per capita (natural logarithm). This 
variable summarizes a variety of relevant differences between member states but also 
captures an important observation about the recent spread of “fl at taxes,” and hence 
small tax rate gaps, in Central and Eastern Europe: fl at taxes mainly serve to signal a 
favorable business climate – a signal that poorer countries may feel more pressured to 
convey (Keen/Kim/Varsano 2006). 
6 The regression is for the year 2004, due to restricted data availability for some of the explanatory 
variables. 
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The results presented in Table 2 clearly support the tax-competition explanation of 
tax rate gaps. The coeffi cients for all three independent variables are sizeable and sta-
tistically highly signifi cant, and the overall model fi t is good. The three-variable model 
explains more than 60 percent of the variance in the tax rate gap (model 1) and, if 
Luxembourg is dropped as an outlier, the explained variance increases to more than 70 
percent (model 2). More importantly, the company tax rate has a strong negative effect 
on the tax rate gap. In fact, if we believed model 2 to refl ect the true causal structure, we 
could conclude that every cut of the company tax rate by one percentage point increases 
the tax rate gap by 0.9 percentage points, all else being equal. This clearly corroborates 
the tax-competition explanation: large tax rate gaps refl ect to a signifi cant extent the 
stringency of competitive constraints rather than the lack of domestic preferences for 
small or zero gaps.7
Tax competition and the pull-down effect
The evidence presented in the previous section suggests that the dominant effect of 
lower company tax rates is to increase tax rate gaps between company and personal 
taxation. However, it follows logically from these results that lower company tax rates 
7 Note that a large tax rate gap is also likely to have an effect on company tax revenues. A stan-
dard explanation of the seeming paradox of decreasing average statutory company tax rates and 
increasing average company tax revenues (fi gure 1 above) is that the broadening of corporate 
tax bases more than compensated the revenue loss from the tax rate cuts (Stewart/Webb 2006). 
While this is possible, it is also likely that the rise in company tax revenues partly refl ects domes-
tic income shifting from the personal to the corporate sector, induced by a large tax rate gaps 
(Fuest/Weichenrieder 2002). Australia provides a good non-European example of this causal 
mechanism (Ganghof/Eccleston 2004). 
Table 2 Explaining the tax rate gap in EU-25 countries in 2004
Dependent variable: tax rate gap 
(2004, top personal minus corporate tax rate)
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2
Company tax rate (2004) –0.86***
(0.15)
–0.90***
(0.14)
Total tax ratio (2002) 0.94***
(0.25)
0.89***
(0.22)
GDP per capita (2002, natural logarithm) 4.06**
(1.81)
5.49***
(1.68)
Constant 19.23
(16.10)
28.91*
(14.66)
Observations 25 24
Excluded outliers None Luxembourg
Adjusted R-squared 0.63 0.71
Notes: Ordinary Least Squares estimation; standard errors in parentheses; * signifi cant at 10%, ** signifi -
cant at 5%, *** signifi cant at 1%.
Sources: Tax rates and population: various sources (see Ganghof 2006: Appendix), total tax ratio: Eurostat 
(2004).
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also tend to pull down personal tax rates on high incomes. If a one percentage point 
cut in the company tax rate leads to a .9 percentage point increase in the tax rate gap, 
it also leads to a cut in the top personal income tax rate of .1 percentage points. While 
this value is not large, it certainly conceals signifi cant cross-national variation (Table 1). 
Some countries continue to pursue their general preference for small tax rate gaps, and 
this certainly has important consequences. 
The German case is a good example (Ganghof 2006: Ch. 7). A reduction in the personal 
income tax rate was not a priority goal of German policymakers in the early 1990s. The 
top personal rate was not particularly high by international comparison (53 percent in 
1990), and the fi scal burden of reunifi cation strongly discouraged any tax giveaway. 
Company taxation was a different matter. The company tax rate stood at a relatively 
high level of 58 percent in 1990, and, as tax competition developed, this was increasingly 
perceived as a crucial handicap for the German economy. Because Germany had long 
had a strong preference for a small tax rate gap, the competitive pressure on the com-
pany tax rate spilled over forcefully into personal taxation: the top personal rate was cut 
to 44 percent in order to allow the company tax rate to fall to 39 percent (Table 1). The 
result was a mixture of reduced progressivity and reduced income tax revenues. The 
Red-Green government (1998–2005) put the overall net tax reduction achieved by its tax 
reforms – income and other taxes – between 1998 and 2005 at almost € 60 billion. 
Tax competition’s pull-down effect on the personal income tax rate signifi cantly con-
strained German governments in their effort to adapt the country’s tax structure to 
various economic challenges. There is broad consensus that one of the biggest obstacles 
to increasing employment is high social security contributions, especially for the low-
skilled (Scharpf 2000; Kemmerling 2005). The Red-Green government (1998–2005) 
pondered over shifting the tax burden away from social security contributions and 
onto progressive income taxes, which imply lower taxes on the low-skilled. However, 
tax competition made such a shift all but impossible. Given the commitment to a small 
tax rate gap, the competitive pressure on the company tax rate meant that personal in-
come tax revenue had to be reduced rather than increased. Revenues from value added 
taxation could be increased but could not be fully used to pay for reductions in social 
security contributions because they had partly to offset the former income tax cuts. 
The new “Grand Coalition” between Christian and Social Democrats (in power since 
2005) decided to increase the value added tax by three percentage points, but only one 
third of this increase was earmarked for reducing social security contributions. Also, 
the government now plans to further cut the company tax rate to 30 percent. This will 
most likely not only stimulate a new round of tax cuts in smaller member states but also 
prompt new debates about the level of personal income tax rates in Germany. But even 
if German personal income tax rates fail to drop further, shifting more of the overall tax 
burden onto income taxes is out of the question. 
The example of Slovakia is in many ways similar. In 2003 the government introduced 
a fl at-rate income tax in order to align the income tax rate with the company tax rate, 
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which, for reasons of competitiveness, was set at the low level of 19%, thus seriously 
constraining the revenue-raising potential of the personal income tax. This weakness 
manifested itself when, in light of Slovakia’s high unemployment, the OECD recom-
mended that the government should reduce social security contributions for low in-
comes, rather than income taxes for high incomes, in order to increase employment. 
Bound by the fl at-tax reform, the authorities argued that “fi scal constraints mean that 
this must be delayed” (Brook/Leibfritz 2005: 14). But these fi scal constraints were to a 
signifi cant extent the indirect effect of company tax competition, which led the govern-
ment to choose such a low tax rate in the fi rst place. 
To be sure, Germany and Slovakia are special cases. The focus on keeping the tax rate 
gap between corporate and personal taxation small is particularly strong, and, hence, 
the pull-down effect is particularly pronounced. Other countries seem less concerned. 
In Denmark and Norway, for instance, tax rate gaps were allowed to grow considerably 
in response to tax competition. Still, the fear of not letting the rate differential grow 
too large was an important reason why both countries cut their top personal income 
tax rates by around 15 percentage points each between 1983 and 2005. The pull-down 
effect was smaller than in Germany or Slovakia but still signifi cant (Sørensen 2005a; 
Ganghof 2007).
4 Taxation and democracy in the EU
The previous sections have demonstrated theoretically and empirically that tax com-
petition has important indirect effects on personal income taxation. Pushing down 
corporate tax rates, it forces governments to choose between two options: accepting a 
widening tax rate gap between company and top personal rates, and hence wasteful tax 
arbitrage between the personal and corporate sector (tax rate gap effect), or lowering the 
top personal rate in step with the company rate (pull down effect). These effects limit the 
revenue-raising potential and/or the progressivity of the personal income tax, and, by 
extension, of the tax system as a whole. In this section we discuss these fi ndings in the 
light of the debate on the EU’s democratic defi cit. We start by reviewing three promi-
nent positions in this debate. 
The fi rst position is closely associated with the work of Giandomenico Majone (e.g. 
1998) and Andrew Moravcsik (e.g. 2002). It holds that there is no democratic defi cit 
because the EU is institutionally constrained to pursue policies that are either Pareto-
improving – i.e. leaving no-one worse off – or centrist, and have low political salience. 
Highly salient redistributive tax and spend policies are systematically excluded from 
the EU’s policy agenda and, with few exceptions, remain under the fi rm control of the 
democratically accountable national governments of the member states. Hence, there is 
no need for a democratization of EU policymaking. 
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The second position is associated with the work of Fritz Scharpf (e.g. 2003b, 2006). It 
holds that there is a democracy defi cit in the EU because the EU’s drive toward mar-
ket integration constrains the redistributive policies of the member states – directly 
through the legal force of the four freedoms and the European competition policy, and 
indirectly through economic competition. The effect of these constrains is not centrist 
but tends to be “neo-liberal.” The way to deal with this predicament is not, however, 
to move to majority rule at the EU level because, given the lack of a strong European 
demos, this could undermine the legitimacy of EU policy processes. Rather, Scharpf ’s 
recent work highlights two options. First, reforms at the national level should increase 
national problem-solving capacities. Second, the procedures for “enhanced co-opera-
tion” should be improved so that “high-tax countries might harmonize profi t taxes at 
least among themselves” (Scharpf 2003a: 55).
The third position has recently been advanced by Andreas Follesdal and Simon Hix 
(Follesdal/Hix 2006). It largely shares Scharpf ’s characterization of EU policies as re-
distributive and challenges the characterization of these policies as centrist. In addition, 
Foellesdal and Hix highlight that the saliency of political issues as well as voters’ prefer-
ences on these issues are partly endogenous to the political process. They are not simply 
given but emerge from the public debate, which is a by-product of political competi-
tion. Hence what matters for democracy is the matching between policy outputs and 
the policy preferences that “have a chance of being created or modifi ed within arenas 
of political contestation” (2006: 556). To improve this matching at the EU level, the au-
thors recommend a number of incremental institutional and behavioral changes that 
would move the EU polity from a hyper-consensual system to a slightly more majoritar-
ian form of government. The crucial reform proposal is to move toward a more open 
political contest for the presidency as well as the policy agenda of the Commission.
How does our analysis of tax competition contribute to this debate? In what follows we 
claim that the fi rst position is refuted by the empirical evidence and argue that the latter 
two positions are more complementary than contradictory. 
The refutation of the fi rst position follows directly from the above analysis: the race 
toward the bottom in company tax rates constrains national taxation systems in im-
portant ways. The sphere of competitive tax rate setting in corporate taxation and the 
sphere of domestic redistribution – of which personal income taxation is a crucial el-
ement – cannot be separated as much as policymakers would wish and Majone and 
Moravcsik seem to assume. It is diffi cult to argue, therefore, that the output of the EU 
multi-level system is not redistributive or centrist. 
While this conclusion is in line with Scharpf ’s analysis, the scope of his suggestions is 
limited. First, we have shown that national tax reforms can at best mitigate, but not tran-
scend, the constraints of international tax competition. It seems somewhat exaggerated, 
therefore, to say that Scandinavia is “immunized against international tax competition 
by the dual income tax” (Scharpf 2006: 856). The dual income tax permits larger tax rate 
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gaps than other income tax models, but the economic connection between corporate 
and personal income tax rates remains. Second, the diversity of member states seems 
too large to allow for company tax harmonization among homogenous subgroups of 
member states. There is not only the high-tax/low-tax cleavage, but also the large/small 
and rich/poor cleavages – and perhaps others as well. Therefore, the group(s) that could 
pursue enhanced co-operation in company taxation would probably be too small to 
make this co-operation worthwhile. If tax harmonization within the EU can reduce 
the force of company tax competition, it must be harmonization among all or most 
EU member states. And since both tax harmonization and the lack thereof involve re-
distributive confl icts at the EU level, Foellesdal and Hix are correct to suggest greater 
political debate and contestation about the EU policy agenda.
But note that the positions of Scharpf and Foellesdal/Hix are more complementary than 
contradictory. Scharpf (2003b: 19) is opposed to changing the formal rules for deciding 
policy issues (too much) in favor of majority rule. Foellesdal and Hix (2006: 553–555), 
by contrast, partly focus on behavioral changes and on the rules for publicizing infor-
mation and fi lling legislative and executive offi ces. This is important because it means 
that any proposals created by more “majoritarian” contestation and debate would still 
have to be passed in supermajoritiarian decision-making institutions. This implies that 
any proposal for company tax harmonization that could emerge as an integral part of 
a larger policy program would have to be in the spirit of Scharpf ’s analyses. That is, it 
would have to maximize national autonomy by increasing the national “problem-solv-
ing capabilities” of some member states without hurting those of other member states 
(too much). 
Why, then, is it useful to move toward more political contestation and debate at the EU 
level? The crucial point is that disagreement in democratic politics not only concerns 
different positions on well-defi ned issues but the very defi nition of issues. How issues 
are defi ned and linked can be crucial for outcomes, but this implies that political con-
fl icts extend straightforwardly to this defi nition and linkage. Hence even if the best that 
can be done at the EU level is to guard national “problem-solving capacities,” there will 
be inevitable and deep political confl ict over what constitutes a policy problem – in tax-
ation and elsewhere – and what constitutes a European solution that guards the policy 
autonomy of different member states roughly equally. Hence the issue is not political 
contestation instead of broadly agreeable solutions but political contestation about what 
might be considered to be widely agreeable solutions.
In fact, we regard the EU debate about company taxation as a good example of how the 
lack of political debate and contestation leads to one-sided issue defi nition. As argued 
above, the EU debate on company taxation – with the European Commission as a cru-
cial agenda setter within this debate – has ignored the indirect effects of company tax 
competition, even though it is arguably these indirect effects that have had the greatest 
ramifi cations. The best example is the German example discussed above. Company tax 
competition crucially contributed to quite “neo-liberal” tax reforms on the part of a 
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Red-Green government, but the links between this result and EU (non-)decisions re-
main unclear. The issue of indirect effects has not yet been politicized at either the EU 
or the national level.
This certainly has consequences for the debate about European solutions. If the issue of 
indirect effects were politicized more, the search for solutions would have to focus more 
on strengthening the backstop function of the company tax. In what follows we want to 
provide a rough sketch of how a focus on this backstop function might actually lead to 
more agreeable proposals for company tax harmonization. 
The standard proposal for company tax harmonization is a common minimum com-
pany tax rate at the EU level (de Mooij 2004). A minimum rate restricts tax competition 
but does not erase it; it puts a fl oor under tax rate choice without eliminating all room 
for competitive tax rate setting. But the choice of the appropriate level of the minimum 
rate is still characterized by a zero-sum confl ict between countries that prefer higher 
and lower company tax rates, respectively. 
The situation seems less grim if the European policy debate is refocused on the backstop 
function of the corporate tax (Ganghof 2006: 158). Let us recall from section 2 that this 
backstop function of the corporate tax depends mainly on the level at which above-
normal profi ts are taxed. This creates the opportunity to choose different minimum tax 
rate levels for normal and above-normal profi ts in order to reduce the confl ict involved 
in tax rate harmonization. The minimum tax rate on above-normal profi ts could be 
set at a higher level in order to give (high-tax) member states more freedom to choose 
their preferred level and progressivity of personal income taxation; the rate on normal 
profi ts, in contrast, could be set at a lower level – or even at zero – in order to give (low-
tax) member states more freedom to tax marginal investments at low rates in order to 
increase investment incentives.8
Note that such a differentiation of the minimum tax rate would require harmonization 
of the company tax base – something that is currently being pursued by the Europe-
an Commission (2001, 2003, 2005). A standard method of distinguishing normal and 
above-normal profi ts would have to be defi ned, drawing on the experiences of coun-
tries that have experimented with dual income taxes (e.g. Italy, Scandinavia) or direct 
expenditure taxes (e.g. Croatia). While this would certainly be an ambitious reform 
project, the differentiation of minimum tax rates could further mitigate, though not 
eliminate, political confl icts over the adequate levels of these rates. This might increase 
the opportunities for agreement.
8 In a sense, this proposal would allow countries to react to the imposition of a minimum tax 
rate by narrowing the tax base (Klemm 2004). However, this would happen in a systematic and 
transparent way. 
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By way of illustration, let us assume that a minimum tax rate for above-normal profi ts is 
set at, say, 25 percent. This would make it easier for countries like Germany or Denmark to 
maintain relatively high personal income tax rates in the future. For if all capital income 
were also taxed at the personal level at a uniform tax rate of 25 percent, the combined 
tax burden on above-normal capital income would be 44 percent (0.25+[1–0.25]*0.25). 
Hence if the top personal income tax rate on wages were 44 percent (as currently in Ger-
many), incentives for tax arbitrage would virtually disappear. If the top rate on wages 
were much higher (as currently in Denmark), incentives for tax arbitrage would still be 
much lower than in a situation with a company tax rate of, say, 10 percent or less – a tax 
rate that might easily materialize if tax competition continues unabated. At the same 
time, a minimum tax rate of 25 percent on above-normal profi ts would allow countries 
like Slovakia or Latvia to choose much lower top personal income tax rates – even lower 
than 25 percent – and to exempt above-normal profi ts at the personal level so that the 
overall tax burden on these profi ts would not increase beyond 25 percent. In addition, 
these countries would be free to further reduce the effective company tax burden by 
making normal capital income tax-exempt altogether. 
Of course, this is only a very rough sketch and it concerns only one option for strength-
ening the backstop function of company taxation. The point of the discussion has not 
been to develop and analyze this and other options in detail, but to exemplify the im-
portance of political contestation and debate. For even if EU policy initiatives need to 
protect national autonomy and thus be widely agreeable, the debate about such initia-
tives involves deep confl icts over how to defi ne policy problems and solutions. More-
over, our point is not that some form of tax harmonization is necessary to mitigate 
the democratic defi cit in the EU. Rather, whatever choice is made – for unconstrained 
tax competition or for some form of harmonization – it needs to be contested and de-
bated. 
The ultimate justifi cation of majoritarian procedures is the fundamental democratic 
value of political equality (Dahl 2006). Part of the democratic ideal is to give citizens 
equal resources for deciding and linking political issues, and majority rule is under a 
broad range of circumstances the most egalitarian decision-making rule. It is the value 
of equality that explains why we care not only about EU citizens’ existing policy prefer-
ences but also about those that might have been created in a more majoritarian process 
(cf. Follesdal/Hix 2006). While it is true that the current circumstances in the EU do 
not allow a simple move to majority rule in deciding policy issues, it may indeed al-
low slightly more majoritarianism – and hence more equality – in defi ning and linking 
them. 
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5 Conclusions
We have shown that company tax competition in the EU has important indirect effects 
on personal income taxation. Because company taxes serve as a backstop for personal 
income taxes, company tax competition severely constrains the revenue-raising poten-
tial and/or the progressivity of personal income taxation and thus is a crucial compo-
nent of national revenue and welfare state systems. 
This fi nding has important implications for normative debates on the democratic defi -
cit and on tax harmonization. It shows that EU (non-)decisions can be clearly redis-
tributive, implying that the democratic defi cit is real. As a result, greater political con-
testation about the EU’s policy agenda seems desirable even if decision-making rules 
have to remain supermajoritarian in order to provide suffi cient protection for national 
diversity and policy autonomy. The reason is that the defi nition and linkage of policy 
issues can greatly affect political debates and outcomes. In other words, the issue is 
not political contestation instead of widely agreeable solutions but political contestation 
about what might be regarded as being widely agreeable solutions.
With respect to tax competition, we have shown that the lack of political contestation 
and debate has led to one-sided issue defi nition. To exemplify the point we have sug-
gested that greater politicization of the indirect effects of company tax competition 
would likely inspire a search for new and better ways to reconcile pro-harmonization 
and pro-competition interests. As one example we have suggested a proposal for dif-
ferentiated minimum rates for normal and above-normal profi ts, which focuses on the 
backstop function of the company tax while giving member states more freedom to 
determine their average effective company tax burden unilaterally. 
We do not want to suggest, however, that political contestation would or should lead 
to tax rate harmonization – and hence that democratization goes hand in hand with 
harmonization. To the contrary, more open political debate about the redistributive 
consequences might lead to a more explicit decision in favor of a different option. The 
point is simply that this decision should be the end of a more open political contest over 
the defi nition and linkage of policy issues. 
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